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
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Urbanization, education, and the politics of space on the Tibetan Plateau

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ABSTRACT

This article provides an introduction to a special collection of five articles showcasing the work of rising scholars in the geography and anthropology of Tibetan regions in China (Eveline Washul, Andrew Grant, Tsering Bum, Huatse Gyal and Duojie Zhaxi, published in *Critical Asian Studies* 50: 4 and *Critical Asian Studies* 51: 1). It contextualizes the authors' contributions in the recent promotion of planned urbanization in Tibetan regions as the key to achieving the "Chinese Dream" under President Xi Jinping. The paper calls attention to these authors' focus on Tibetan experiences of new urbanization policies and practices, as well as their less-appreciated entanglement with shifting education priorities. Providing brief summaries of each author's case study and arguments, it points to the ways in which all five articles address the relationship between space and subjectivity, as well as the issue of constrained agency (versus simple notions of "choice"), in statist urbanization processes.

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Introduction: urbanization

The speed and scale of China's urbanization since the 1980s are unprecedented in human history. From below twenty percent in 1978, China's urbanization level surpassed the fifty percent mark in 2011, and has only continued to grow. In 2014, the State Council under President Xi Jinping approved the "National Plan for a New Model of Urbanization," calling for sixty percent of the population to live in urban areas by 2020. In Xi's China, this planned urbanization is seen as the key to the achievement of the "Chinese Dream" of prosperity and rejuvenation. Despite the city of Beijing's mass eviction of thousands of rural migrants following a tragic fire in November 2017, and the State Council's 2018 strategic plan for rural revitalization, recent estimates suggest that by 2030, the country's cities will be home to more than one billion people, or seventy percent of the population. According to Chinese planners, much of this urbanization will happen in smaller cities: the number of cities with a population of greater than one million is expected to more than double from the current 102 by 2025.

²Accessed November 1, 2018: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t1230005.htm.

The urban today is thus privileged in China as the site of progress and modernity, the imaginative horizon of the future, and a synonym for development itself. Planners take urbanization to be the central means for continued economic growth and modernization. At the same time, urbanization is also a key process for reproducing state power. As geographer Tim Oakes notes, China appears to be taking to heart Henri Lefebvre's argument that the ideology of urbanism has replaced that of industrialization as the medium of history and progress. Thus, as Oakes put this, "The state in China reproduces itself in urbanism, not merely by constructing cities, but in the way the state is restructured and reorganized in the form of urban institutions." The significance of the urban as both the inevitable site of dreams of future prosperity as well as the locus of state power is both underpinned and reinforced by China's territorial administrative hierarchy, which structures subnational territory and ranks administrative divisions. Higher ranks correspond to greater central-level political and financial support, as well as greater power within a city's jurisdiction. Because administrative divisions structure urban economies, the Chinese party-state makes use of administrative changes to guide economic development in a process that Carolyn Cartier analyzes as "territorial urbanization." This has resulted in the establishment of over 400 new cities since the 1980s, mostly through the transformation of counties and prefectures into county-level and prefectural-level cities.⁵

The concept of urbanization thus names multiple related but distinct processes that include "in situ urbanization" or rural urbanization "from below;" the expansion of urban peripheries, involving the top-down expropriation of farmland; the administrative promotion of rural units to urban units; and temporary, circular, or permanent migration from rural to urbanized areas, ranging from new settlements and housing projects built in local towns to China's megacities. There is now a large body of scholarship on these issues in China, which has fruitfully addressed how gender, class, educational attainment, and household registration status structure the urban experience. However, relatively little has been written about ethnic minority, and in particular Tibetan, experiences of urbanization.

Tibetan areas of what is now the People's Republic of China (PRC) have historically been sparsely populated; the largest urban center, Lhasa, had a population of only 30,000 in the 1950s. The phenomena of rural-urban labor migration and urbanization began later in Tibetan areas and for Tibetans than they did across China as a whole, but are now moving full steam ahead. For example, five of six prefectures of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) have been converted to urban prefecture-level municipalities, and two rural counties of Lhasa Municipality, the capital of the TAR, have recently been converted to urban districts, a process that involves substantial farmland expropriation and the displacement of people from rural villages to high-rise apartment blocks. The TAR government plans to raise the provincial urbanization rate from 25.7 percent in 2014 to over thirty percent by 2020. Outside of the TAR, a number of rural Tibetan counties (including Yulshul in Qinghai Province, Dartsedo and Barkham in Sichuan Province, Shangrila in Yunnan Province, and Tso in Gansu Province) have also been upgraded to

³Oakes 2017, 4.

⁴Cartier 2015.

⁵Cartier 2016.

⁶7hu et al. 2013

⁷Accessed November 1, 2018: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t1230005.htm.

county-level cities over the last decade. Even in counties that remain officially rural, such as Rebgong (Tongren) in Qinghai Province, the expansion of urban county seats has led to significant farmland expropriation, a form of dispossession not only of the means of production, but also of community territory and collective fortune.8

At the same time, Xining, the capital of Oinghai Province, is now home to about 120,000 Tibetans out of a population of 2.3 million. Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province and, unlike Xining, historically not a place of significant Tibetan settlement, has an estimated 100,000-200,000 Tibetan residents. 10 Importantly, urban administrative units are ethnically unmarked; cities do not have "autonomous" status and associated cultural and political rights. Mongolian scholar Uradyn Bulag has argued that as a consequence the administrative promotion of rural counties to urban municipalities is a "shortcut to overcoming ethnic autonomy." 11 Not surprisingly, despite Tibetans being the fastest growing minority group in Chengdu, recent efforts to seek bilingual education for Tibetan children in the main Tibetan neighborhood have been met with no response from city authorities. At the same time, Tibetans who migrate to large Chinese cities often experience ethnic discrimination.¹²

Thus, it is clear that, whether as a result of migration to large cities such as Xining and Chengdu, the expropriation of farmland and resettlement of farmers into apartment blocks, or the resettlement of pastoralists in concentrated housing in towns, the urban as a social form has effects on everyday Tibetan experiences and subjectivities which deserve to be explored. The articles in this collection 13 contribute substantially to the still very small body of research to date on the Tibetan urban experience.¹⁴

The education-urbanization nexus

Another key driver of Tibetan urbanization has been the Chinese state's suite of educational policies and practices over the past two decades. However, the link between education and urbanization has received scant attention in the literature on urbanization and Tibetan education. Recent work on Tibetan education has fruitfully explored the relationship between education trajectories, educational language mediums, and Tibetan identity. For example, based on an ethnographic study at the Minzu University of China in Beijing, Miaoyan Yang finds that Tibetan students have very different relationships to Tibetanness, depending on whether their prior education was primarily Tibetan-medium or Chinese-medium, and whether or not they studied in schools established in "inland" China for Tibetan students.¹⁵ She further finds that the experience of studying at Minzu University strengthens most students' sense of their own Tibetan identity. Adrian Zenz similarly argues that bottom-up educational Tibetanization efforts in Qinghai Province have contributed to a sense of pride in Tibetan-ness. However, the growing number of Tibetan-medium tertiary graduates who have strong Tibetan language

⁸Maklev 2018.

⁹Roche, Hillman and Liebold 2017.

¹⁰Lei 2013, Washul 2018.

¹¹Bulag 2002.

¹²Grant 2017.

¹³See Critical Asian Studies 50 (3) and Critical Asian Studies 50 (4).

¹⁴Grant 2018a, Hillman 2013, Makley 2018, Yeh 2013.

¹⁵Yang 2017.

proficiency have encountered a decline in employment opportunities, particularly with the end of the socialist job allocation (*fenpei*) system. ¹⁶

In contrast to these works, the articles in this collection hone in on the multifaceted ways in which education policies have radically reshaped the politics of space for Tibetans. China's spatial hierarchy, or the "center problem" as one of Andrew Grant's interlocutors describes it, means that each higher level of education corresponds with a move to a more urban administrative unit, from primary school in the village to secondary school in the county seat to higher education in the prefectural, provincial, or even national capital. Higher levels of education are mapped onto the hierarchical administrative scales of the state, with the largest urban areas being the sites of the pinnacle of educational achievement as well as modernity, civilization, and development. Thus, middle-class Tibetans, for example, are motivated to purchase apartments in Xining because the city has the best schools in Qinghai. 18

This centralization and administrative urban scaling has been further exacerbated by the School Consolidation Policy, which was launched nationally in 2001 and implemented in various Tibetan areas at later dates. 19 This policy has spurred the closing of the majority of village schools, many built during the 1980s and 1990s, which means that most rural Tibetan children are now forced to live in boarding schools in distant townships or county seats starting from an early age. This in turn has been a major factor driving rural Tibetan households to move to urban areas, in order to live with or at least be closer to their children. Indeed, this is a central finding of Tsering Bum, who argues that rather than "ecological migrants" (as state policy describes them) pastoralists in Yulshul (site of his fieldwork) who have taken part in state resettlement policies should more accurately be understood as "education and healthcare migrants." At the same time, the need to provide better quality education for pastoralists has also been a government rationale for moving them to urban areas beginning with the New Socialist Countryside program in 2006.²¹ However, as both Tsering Bum and Huatse Gyal demonstrate, there has also been significant resistance to the School Consolidation Policy in Tibetan regions.²²

Articles in this special collection

Urbanization centralizes resources not only for education, but also for health care and employment. These articles offer a fresh perspective on how Tibetans are navigating the forms of centralization, scale-making, and hierarchization of places that have resulted. The five authors in this collection are all highly promising members of a new generation of cultural anthropology and human geography scholars who focus on Tibet, with two contributions by recent Ph.D.s and three by advanced graduate students. Each of the contributors brings to their research work experience in the region, the ability to speak both Tibetan and Chinese, and rigorous training in social science theories, literatures, and

¹⁶Zenz 2014.

¹⁷Grant 2018b, Washul 2018.

¹⁸Grant 2018b.

¹⁹Gyal 2019, Makley 2018, Mei et al. 2015, Postiglione, Jiao and Li 2012; Wright 2018.

²⁰See also Bessho 2015.

²¹Makley 2018, Gyal 2019.

²²Also see Makley 2018.

methodologies. In addition, it is particularly exciting that three of these authors are native to the Amdo Tibetan region; their scholarship is thus informed by native linguistic abilities as well as unparalleled research access in an area where it is becoming ever-harder for non-PRC citizens to conduct fieldwork. Members of a unique cohort of Tibetans who are connected through personal ties to rural areas, are highly literate in Tibetan, and have had the opportunity to undertake doctoral training abroad, these authors represent the possibility of a bright future for contemporary Tibetan studies.

Focusing on the scale of the city, Andrew Grant analyzes how the "civilized city" campaign in Xining, the capital of Qinghai Province, works together with the type of urban "hyperbuilding" that is increasingly common across Asia, to further marginalize the large numbers of Tibetans who have migrated there over the past several decades.²³ The city of Xining has a long history as a multi-ethnic place; it has been not just a Chinese frontier garrison, but also the capital of a Tibetan federation and an important Islamic center. However, as Grant demonstrates, new forms of spectacular urbanism not only bolster Chinese state power but also privilege Han Chinese, who are associated with higher levels of civilization and quality, and the dominant national urban imaginary. As Xining's urban plan calls for the building of a number of new urban centers, older neighborhoods associated with Tibetans have become devalued, shaping new hierarchies of place desirability. This has resulted in the spatialization not only of class, as Li Zhang and others have described in their work on the contemporary Chinese city, but also of ethnicity.²⁴ Grant argues that Tibetans, and other minorities, have been imaginatively fixed to older and less developed parts of the city by Tibetans and Han alike. While middle-class Tibetans desire to buy houses in the spectacular, hyperbuilt, "civilized" new neighborhoods of the city, their presence is effectively rendered invisible there. At the same time, though, Grant demonstrates that the cultivation of subjectivities is hardly complete. Newer Tibetan migrants and those with less stable sources of income are, he finds, much more likely to ignore or completely reject these spatial mappings and ideals of civilization, development, and urbanization.

While Grant demonstrates how some Tibetans rework the state's hierarchies of place within Xining, Eveline Washul examines the reworking of place hierarchies across administrative scales and across the country.²⁵ Focusing on Tibetan college graduates from pastoral backgrounds, she demonstrates the importance of ethnicity on social and spatial mobility within contemporary China. While both educational opportunities and employment structures draw Tibetans to urban centers, ethnic discrimination and relational responsibilities to home places and communities mean that these urban centers are not the "first-tier" cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen that typical Chinese college graduates aspire to move to, but rather provincial and prefectural seats and county towns that are administratively connected with their rural home villages. In particular, the disproportionate representation of the state sector in Tibetan employment, due in no small part to ethnic discrimination in the private sector, helps channel Tibetans back to these lower-tier cities, 26 but so too do cultural logics of parent-child relationships and understandings of large cities as places that erode Tibetan cultural identity and ways

²³Grant 2018b.

²⁴Zhang 2010.

²⁵Washul 2018.

²⁶See also Fischer and Zenz 2018.

of life. Importantly, Washul shows how both education and urbanization shape Tibetan experiences of translocality - of simultaneous identification with more than one locality. She also focuses on how state education (in urban locations) transforms the meanings of "home" in ways that are structured by statist administrative units and scales. Washul documents experiences of discrimination in urban centers such as Chengdu, but like Grant also shows how Tibetans reject and invert discourses of Tibetan backwardness.

College-educated civil servants with pastoralist backgrounds of the type that Washul discusses are central as well to Tsering Bum's analysis.²⁷ Analyzing the processes of translation and communication in the implementation of China's Ecological Migration Policy (EMP) and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), Tsering Bum highlights the crucial role played by local bureaucrats in remaking the narratives of overgrazing and the tragedy of the commons that underlie EMP, which both pastoralists and they themselves find nonsensical, into ones that pastoralists find more acceptable. Thus, he finds that pastoralists in Zachen, Yulshul Prefecture, Qinghai believe they are subsidized not because they are causing ecological degradation (as state policies suggest) but rather for poverty alleviation or as a "price for land" in exchange for agreeing to resettlement. His analysis reveals that the implementation of EMP and its associated resettlement of pastoralists in towns is made possible only at the conjuncture of a number of processes and policies: processes of policy translation, state educational policies of compulsory education and school consolidation, pastoralists' desire for access to educational opportunities and medical facilities, and income from caterpillar fungus harvesting that enables pastoralists to survive economically in towns. The pivotal role of education in urbanization is strongly demonstrated in the case of one community with an influential village leader who managed to maintain a village school: far fewer pastoralists from that community had moved to urban areas as a result.

Where Tsering Bum takes pastoralists' desires for education as a starting point, Huatse Gyal critically examines the history of this desire, demonstrating that it has not always been present.²⁸ Through a detailed ethnographic study of one local monk's long-term efforts to build a primary school in his home pastoral village of Kurti Ribo, Dzorge County, Ngawa Prefecture of Sichuan Province, Huatse Gyal explores villagers' longstanding reluctance to send their children to school. He argues that the existing literature on this issue has missed one crucial reason: rural Tibetans in the 1990s viewed education as a state project, and their refusal to send their children to school must be considered in part as a form of resistance to statist projects. He explores what has happened to change this relationship between Tibetan pastoralists in Kurti Ribo and schooling. Akhu, the monk founder of the community's primary school, made significant efforts to localize education by incorporating Buddhist beliefs and values into his school's design, through a ceremony to consecrate the land on which the school gate was built, as well as through other place-making efforts that allowed the school to take on new meanings beyond that of the state. At the same time, Huatse Gyal describes the shift in the regional political economy to a xiangmu (project) economy, which has deepened local dependence on cash and redefined understandings of wealth and the value of different forms of livelihoods. As

²⁷Bum 2018.

²⁸Gyal 2019.

pastoralism comes to be increasingly devalued, parents see schooling, generally through settlement in urban towns, as a necessity, driving further social-spatial change.

Duojie Zhaxi also addresses the implications of the project economy for spatial transformation and Tibetan subjectivities.²⁹ He presents a detailed ethnographic examination of Tibetan participation in two house construction projects in a farming village in Trika (Guide) County, Qinghai Province. He adopts a governmentality approach to analyze the provision of subsidies for the "Dilapidated House Renovation" and "Reward-based Housing Construction" projects as a form of statist development. He finds that the availability of "free" subsidies for new house construction has spurred active participation in the construction of large, often lavish houses that villagers describe, using a Chinese loanword, as "modern" (xiandai). Like the hyper-built, "civilized" parts of Xining that Grant finds are devoid of Tibetan (and other) ethnic minority architectural markers, officials promote concrete and brick as the more "modern" dwelling materials for villagers. As with housing projects elsewhere across the Tibetan Plateau, state subsidies in this case are generally insufficient to cover the full construction costs of a new house, let alone the furnishings seen as necessary for these larger, upgraded spaces. This both saddles poorer households with debt and spurs labor migration to urban areas in search of income-generation opportunities. Duojie Zhaxi also finds that in the course of several years of implementation of these projects, poorer households generally received much smaller subsidies than wealthier households. Thus, in addition to producing avid market consumers, the projects have also deepened income disparities among Tibetan households within the village. This growing inequality among Tibetans that has taken shape alongside marketization, increased indebtedness, and an increasingly consumer lifestyle resonates with Washul's findings that new forms of translocality among college-educated Tibetans have also exacerbated inequalities within Tibetan communities.

Cross-cutting themes

The summaries above should give a sense of some of the themes that emerge from these studies of the pressing social-spatial transformations of the Tibetan Plateau in the twentyfirst century. These include the exacerbation of inequalities at various scales, the devaluation of pastoral livelihoods and its effects, and the ways in which related values of civilization, quality, modernity, and development are mapped onto urban spaces. Beyond this, two cross-cutting themes deserve some further discussion: the relationship between space and subjectivity, and the issue of constrained agency.

Both Andrew Grant's and Duojie Zhaxi's contributions are explicitly attentive to the ways in which the production of particular types of governable spaces works hand in glove with the production of governable subjects. Building on the work of Luigi Tomba, both demonstrate that housing is a key site of bio-political governmentality.³⁰ In urban areas, the state seeks to foster a politically docile middle class through the provision of private housing communities. Beyond Tomba's focus on class, however, Grant demonstrates how the city and its hyperbuilt districts are spaces also designed to produce certain types of desirable subjects - civilized, high-quality, and ethnically unmarked.

²⁹Zhaxi 2019.

³⁰Tomba 2009, 2014.

The relationship between visible markers of ethnicity and bio-political urbanism thus differs from that in Guizhou Province, where Tim Oakes has argued that the city of Tongren's happiness campaign takes the form of an "ethnic facelift" for the city, involving decorations with the kinds of ethnic minority cultural markers that are erased from hyperbuilt spaces of Xining.³¹ In both cases, however, the space of the city is "not simply a spatial frame within which to insert certain kinds of social engineering projects" but rather is itself a sort of machine that works to enact those projects.³²

If the city can act to produce and govern certain types of subjects, so too can the space of a house, as Duojie Zhaxi argues.³³ New large and subsidized "modern" houses spur the need for additional income to pay back loans and furnish the houses. The felt need for increased consumption to support these new houses guides Tibetans to pursue the middle class "Chinese Dream" and take on its associated subjectivity. Finally, though he does not use the term governmentality, Huatse Gyal also examines how the xiangmu or project economy - which serves as an important backdrop to all of these articles and deserves further scrutiny - has worked to reconfigure pastoralists' habits, aspirations, and beliefs.

A second major theme that cuts across these papers is that of constrained agency. Each of the authors is careful to highlight both the creative, agentive capacities of Tibetans, as well as the ways in which that agency is highly constrained. This perspective flies in the face of consumerist or developmentalist notions of "choice" touted by project officials and planners. Tsering Bum forcefully argues that pastoralists in Zachen, Yulshul are not passive recipients or victims of state policies, but rather participate in the EMP to achieve their goals of gaining access to health and educational facilities. However, he is also careful to note that the choices Tibetan pastoralists make are strongly limited by both the active elimination of educational services through the School Consolidation Policy as well as the neglect of healthcare services in rural areas. He concludes by stating, "This account of 'choice' making by Tibetan pastoralists in relation to discourses of agency and structure deserve further research and in-depth exploration." Huatse Gyal directly addresses pastoralists' former refusal to send their children to school as a form of resistance to the state. Where Tsering Bum describes pastoralists as strategically embracing legibility to access education and health care, Huatse Gyal asks how they come to desire access to education in the first place. His case study of Akhu's persistent efforts to build a school that villagers will accept illustrates the ways in which Tibetans strategically embrace certain dimensions of state policies while simultaneously engaging in practices of localization, place-making, and the incorporation of older spaces and practices.

Duojie Zhaxi's discussion of participation in housing reconstruction also problematizes the notion of choice. Although the decision of whether to build a new house or remodel an existing house is, in theory, up to each household to make, all households in the village in which he conducted his fieldwork have in fact demolished their old houses and built new ones. As he demonstrates, this can be explained through a confluence of factors, including pressure from local officials as well as internalized desires for material improvement and modernity as indexed by possession of a new, "modern" house. Agentive "choices" are

³¹Oakes 2017.

³²Oakes 2017, 2.

³³See also Gaerrang 2015.

thus simultaneously channeled by governmentality and constrained by the material outcomes of state policies, such as the closure of schools by the School Consolidation Policy, indebtedness engineering, and more direct forms of compulsion, such as pressure from local officials to build new houses. This suggests that our understandings of urbanization, education, and social-spatial transformation in contemporary Tibetan areas need to be informed not only by governmentality but also by attention to co-present state-centered forms of sovereign power.

Together, these articles lay the foundations for continued research on Tibetan and other ethnic minority communities' relationships to and experiences of the urbanization-education nexus in contemporary China. Hopefully future studies will be able to examine the intersectionality of gender with ethnicity and class in processes of education and urbanization.³⁴ Another important topic for future investigation is the types of spaces that are produced by the project economy. The spatialities and materialities of schools themselves should also be further considered to interrogate the ways in which they successfully or unsuccessfully work to produce particular subjectivities. Finally, though it currently seems unlikely, we hope that future researchers will also be able to study these processes in Tibetan areas beyond Amdo and limited parts of Kham.

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Emily T. Yeh is a professor of geography at the University of Colorado Boulder. She studies development and nature-society relations in Tibetan parts of the PRC, including the political ecology of pastoralism, vulnerabilities to climate change, ideologies of nature and nation, and emerging environmental subjectivities. Her book Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development (Cornell University Press, 2013) explores the intersection of political economy and cultural politics of development as a project of state territorialization. She has also edited several books and special issues, including Mapping Shangrila: Contested Landscapes in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands (University of Washington Press, 2014).

Charlene Makley is a professor of anthropology at Reed College in Portland, Oregon. Her work has explored the history and cultural politics of state-building, economic development, and Buddhist revival among Tibetans in China's restive frontier zones of southeast Qinghai and southwest Gansu since 1992. Her first book, The Violence of Liberation: Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revival in Post-Mao China (University of California Press, 2007) was based on her fieldwork at Labrang (Xiahe) in Gansu. Her second book, The Battle for Fortune: State-Led Development, Personhood and Power among Tibetans in China (Cornell University Press, 2018) is an ethnography of state-local relations in the historically Tibetan region of Rebgong (southeast Qinghai) in the wake of China's "Great Open the West" campaign and the 2008 military crackdown following Tibetan unrest.

³⁴Only Washul's article in this issue addresses gender.



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